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JURISDICTION 
As a basis for his appeal, plaintiff relies on Utah Code 
Ann,, §78-2-2(3) (amended 1988), and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court, 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Hugh Schurtz ("Schurtz"), has appealed 
from a final order and judgment rendered by the Honorable Frank 
G. Noel, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County. On appeal, Schurtz claims that the trial 
court's grant of partial summary judgment against him on the 
issue of incidental and consequential damages was a clear error 
of lawe Schurtz further claims that the trial court erred or 
abused its discretion by failing to award all of his costs of 
court and attorney's fees. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
In his brief on appeal, Schurtz identifies three issues for 
decision by the Supreme Court: 
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Issue I 
Did the trial court err in granting BMW's motion 
for partial summary judgment on Schurtz's claim for 
incidental and consequential damages? 
Issue II 
Did the trial court make findings sufficient to 
support its decision to award Schurtz less than his 
full claim for attorneyfs fees? 
Issue III 
Did the preponderance of credible evidence 
presented at trial support the court's decision to 
discount the attorney's fees award? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Plaintiff claims in his brief that this appeal involves 
matters of first impression for the court. 
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A. United States Code, Plaintiff requests the court 
to interpret 15 U.S.C. §2301 et seq., commonly known 
as the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act. (A complete copy 
is included in the Appendix). 
B. Utah Code Annotated, Plaintiff requests the court 
to interpret Utah Code Ann., §70A-2-719 as it affects 
new car limited warranties under the Magnusson-Moss 
Act. 
1. 70A-2-316(4) 
Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance 
with the provisions of this chapter on liquidation or 
limitation of damages and on contractual modification of 
remedy. 
2. 70A-2-719e Contractual modification or limitation of 
remedy. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of 
this section and of the preceding section on 
liquidation and limitation of damages, 
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition 
to or in substitution for those provided in this 
chapter and may limit or alter the measure of 
damages recoverable under this chapter, as by 
limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the 
goods and repayment of the price or to repair and 
replacement of nonconforming goods or parts; and 
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless 
the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in 
which case it is the sole remedy. 
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited 
remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be 
had as provided in this act. 
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(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless 
the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. 
Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the 
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie 
unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss 
is commercial is not. 
C. The following provision of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is determinative of the issues on appeal: 
1. Rule 52(a) 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury 
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the 
facts specially and state separately in its conclusions 
of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant 
to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for 
findings are not necessary for purposes of review. 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the 
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered 
as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated 
orally and recorded in open court following the close 
of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum 
of decision filed by the court. The trial court need 
not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). 
The court shall, however, issue a brief written 
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b) , 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
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D. The following provision of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration is determinative of the issues on appeal: 
1. Rule 4-501(5) 
The points and authorities in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section 
that contains a concise statement of material facts as 
to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. 
Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered 
sentences and shall refer with particularity to those 
portions of the record upon which the opposing party 
relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered 
sentence or sentences of the movantfs facts that are 
disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's 
statement shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of 
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by 
the opposing partyfs statement. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case» 
This action arose out of Schurtz! s purchase of a BMW model 
320i Automobile ("Automobile"). The complaint alleged various 
causes of action under a limited warranty against BMW as the 
manufacturer of the Automobile and the BMW dealers. In his 
complaint, Schurtz alleged that the Automobile was defective when 
sold. He further claimed that BMW and the BMW dealers failed to 
correct certain purported defects under the terms of the warranty 
issued by BMW, notwithstanding his refusal to allow the BMW 
dealers to complete certain repairs and after several offers by 
BMW to replace the Automobile. (Record at 1-3). The complaint 
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alleged six separate and distinct causes of action (Record at 3-
10) all arising out of the same basic facts: 
1. The Automobile was sold with a limited warranty 
against defects in materials and workmanship; 
2. Schurtz brought the Automobile in for repairs numerous 
times over a period of a year and a half and had extensive 
contacts with BMW and the BMW dealers during that period in 
efforts to correct the claimed defects; and 
3. BMW and the BMW dealers allegedly failed to correct the 
alleged defects. 
The complaint was based on legal theories of breach of 
express and implied warranties under the Magnusson-Moss Warranty 
Act ("Magnusson-Moss") , the Utah Uniform Commercial Code 
("U.C.C.11) and negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation, in 
violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. (Record at 3-
10) . Schurtz claimed damages, including the purchase price of 
the Automobile, incidental and consequential damages for costs 
and expenses allegedly incurred in his efforts to have the 
defects corrected, attorney's fees, costs and punitive damages. 
(Record at 10 and 11). 
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B. Disposition In The District Court. 
Based on a motion for partial summary judgment filed by 
BMW, the trial court granted judgment in favor of the defendants 
before trial, dismissing Schurtzfs claims for negligent and 
intentional misrepresentation, (Fourth Cause of Action) breach of 
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (Fifth Cause of Action) and 
for punitive damages on all claims. (Record at 423-425). After 
the first day of trial and following Schurtz's testimony, the 
trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of BMW on 
the issue of incidental and consequential damages. (Record at 
1182). The parties later stipulated that BMW would allow Schurtz 
to return the Automobile and refund the purchase price minus a 
credit to BMW for actual use. (Record at 1182) . It was also 
stipulated that for purposes of the claim for attorney's fees, 
that Schurtz would be deemed to be the prevailing party. (Record 
at 1183; Transcript at 110). 
The trial court received testimony and other evidence on the 
amount of the attorney's fees claimed by Schurtz and took the 
matter under advisement. In a minute entry dated August 9, 1988, 
Judge Noel awarded Schurtz the sum of $10,000 as attorney's fees, 
on the basis that the evidence established that "... this case 
could have and probably should have been settled very early in 
the proceedings for an amount roughly equal to the ultimate 
outcome." (Record at 1141). The Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
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of Law state that the trial court was not persuaded to award 
Schurtz the full amount of attorney's fees he claimed and made a 
substantial discount to an amount determined to be reasonable 
under the circumstances. (Record at 1179). 
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, 
1. The claims raised in the trial court proceeding were 
first made in a complaint (Civil No. C84-0073W) filed by Schurtz 
in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. 
That action was dismissed on June 15, 1984, after a motion to 
dismiss was filed by BMW challenging the court's jurisdiction on 
the basis that the complaint did not allege damages sufficient to 
meet the jurisdictional threshold, excluding punitive damages. 
(Transcript at 128). 
2. Following the dismissal of the action filed in the 
United States District Court, a complaint (Civil No. C84-7463) 
was filed in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County on or about December 18, 1984. (Record at 2). 
3. An order to show cause was subsequently issued by the 
trial court requiring the parties to appear and show cause why 
the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
(Record at 50) . An order of dismissal was entered on July 21, 
1986 due to the plaintifffs failure to appear. (Record at 51, 
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Transcript at 144). The order of dismissal was subsequently set 
aside on the basis of excusable neglect following a hearing on 
October 6, 1986. (Record at 58). 
4c John Baird, Mr. Schurtz's counsel, incurred time in 
setting aside the order of dismissal. (Transcript at 144). 
5. Sometime after the dismissal of the federal court 
action or immediately following the filing of the complaint in 
state court, but prior to the filing of an answer, counsel for 
BMW contacted Schurtz's counsel to discuss settlement. 
(Transcript at 128) . 
6. The settlement discussions included Schurtzfs claims 
for expenses associated with purchasing the Automobile, the costs 
incurred following the purchase, his attorney's fees and costs. 
(Transcript at 130). 
7. BMW made a specific offer of settlement based on 
rescission. (Transcript at 130). The offer was confirmed in 
correspondence dated August 22, 1986, but rescission may have 
been discussed earlier. (Transcript at 131). 
8. John Bairdfs billing records disclosed that settlement 
was discussed by the parties on the following dates: January 23, 
1985, January 24, 1985 (Transcript at 131); March 3, 1986, July 
9 
29, 1986, August 18, 1986, (Transcript at 132); September 9, 
1986, February 18, 1987 (Transcript at 133). 
9. In a letter dated February 18, 1987, the specific terms 
and conditions of a settlement were outlined by Mr. Baird. 
(Transcript at 137) . The letter contained a signature line for 
acknowledgment by counsel for the named defendants. (Transcript 
at 140). The letter later became the subject of a motion to 
enforce settlement. (Transcript at 140). The motion was denied 
following a hearing on April 23, 1987. 
10. Mr. Baird continued to log time after the February, 
1987 settlement letter. (Transcript at 140). 
11. Mr. Baird withdrew as Schurtz's counsel of record 
following the failure of the settlement and subsequently filed an 
attorney's lien in the sum of $23,273.04. (Transcript at 161). 
Mr. McPhie, Schurtz's present counsel of record, entered his 
appearance on April 3, 1987. (Transcript at 163; Record at 
496) . 
12. The complaint filed in state court alleged six separate 
causes of action, including: (1) Breach of the Magnusson-Moss 
Act, (2) Breach of written warranty, (3) Breach of implied 
warranty, (4) Negligent representation, (5) Breach of Utah 
Consumer Sales Law, (6) Breach of warranty under the U.C.C. 
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(Record at 3-10). The complaint claimed punitive damages as well 
as general, incidental and consequential damages. (Record at 10 
and 11). 
13. Several causes of action were based on legal theories 
of fraud and misrepresentation. (Transcript at 141). Based upon 
a motion for partial summary judgment filed by BMW, the trial 
court entered an order dated February 17, 1987, dismissing the 
fourth cause of action (negligent misrepresentation); The fifth 
cause of action (claim under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices 
Act) and all of Schurtz!s claims for punitive damages. (Record at 
423-425; Transcript at 142). 
14. Notwithstanding the dismissal of the claims for 
punitive damage, Schurtz continued to demand payment for damage 
claims that had not survived the motion for partial summary 
judgment and refused to settle. (Transcript at 142 and 143). 
15. During the time Mr. Baird represented Mr. Schurtz, 
several associates were reassigned to the case resulting in an 
overlap of efforts and supervision. (Transcript at 146). Mr. 
Schurtzfs second attorney, David McPhie, was substituted for Mr. 
Baird, after the hearing on the Motion to Compel Settlement but 
prior to trial resulting in a duplication of efforts in reviewing 
files, pleadings and work that had transpired. Mr. Schurtz was 
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billed for the time incurred by Mr. McPhie to acquaint himself 
with the facts of the case. (Transcript at 166). 
16. Mr. McPhiefs billing statements disclosed settlement 
negotiations with BMW on the following dates: September 2, 1987, 
October 16, 1987, March 10, 1988 (Transcript at 167), and July 7, 
1988 (Transcript at 169). 
17. In all of the negotiations between the parties after 
Mr. McPhie entered his appearance, Mr. Schurtz attempted to 
solicit an offer from BMW in an amount substantially in excess of 
a settlement based on rescission. (Transcript at 170). In order 
to "come out on the case", Schurtz claimed entitlement to a 
refund in the purchase price of the Automobile minus a credit for 
mileage (revocation), incidental and consequential damages, costs 
and attorney's fees. (Transcript at 173). The total amount 
claimed by Schurtz was "several multiples" of the rescission 
figure. (Transcript at 174). 
18. The only express warranty at issue in this case is 
BMW's written Limited Warranty ("Warranty") which was given to 
Schurtz when he purchased the Automobile. The warranty 
specifically provides: 
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., HEREBY EXCLUDES INCIDENTAL 
AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING LOSS OF TIME, 
INCONVENIENCE OR LOSS OF USE OF THE VEHICLE, FOR ANY 
BREACH OF ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY, INCLUDING 
THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, APPLICABLE TO 
THIS PRODUCT. (Warranty at 1; Plaintiff's Exhibit P3). 
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19. The Warranty is a limited "repair or replace" type 
warranty which provides in part: "the dealer will, without 
charge for parts or labor either repair or replace said part(s) 
being wholly the responsibility of BMW of North America, Inc." 
(Warranty at 1; Plaintiff's Exhibit P-3). 
20. Schurtz received the Warranty and read it before he 
purchased the Automobile. (Transcript at 8). He understood that 
the Warranty was limited to repair or replacement. (Transcript 
at 9) . 
21. A BMW representative told Schurtz that BMW would repair 
the Automobile, refund his money or replace the Automobile if it 
could not be repaired. (Transcript at 47) . BMW made repeated 
efforts to repair the Automobile but, Schurtz gave up, believing 
that BMW could not make the necessary repairs. (Transcript at 
23) . 
22. Following the first day of trial and after hearing 
Schurtzfs testimony regarding the Warranty and repairs made to 
the Automobile, the trial court granted BMW's motion for partial 
summary judgment on the claim for incidental and consequential 
damages. (Transcript at 95) . The trial court found that 
Magnusson-Moss and the U.C.C. allowed the parties to contract and 
limit the remedies available under the Warranty. (Transcript at 
94) . 
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23. The parties stipulated at trial that for the limited 
purpose of determining the issue of attorneys fees, Schurtz would 
be deemed to be the prevailing party. (Transcript at 110; Record 
at 1183). The trial court received testimony and evidence on the 
amount claimed by Schurtz as attorneys fees. In a minute entry 
dated August 9, 1988, Judge Noel awarded Schurtz the sum of 
$10,000 as attorney fs fees on the basis that ". . . this case 
could have and probably should have been settled very early in 
the proceedings for an amount roughly equal to the ultimate 
outcome." (Record at 1141). The minute entry on the issue of 
attorney's fees was included in finding number four of the trial 
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Record at 
1176) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issue I 
Schurtz was provided with a Warranty at the time he 
purchased the Automobile. The Warranty specifically excluded 
incidental and consequential damages in bold type on its face. 
The exclusion of incidental and consequential damages is a 
separate and independent part of the Warranty and must be viewed 
apart from the limited Warranty to repair or replace. The trial 
court did not err in dismissing Schurtzf s claim for incidental 
and consequential damages. 
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Issue II 
The issue of the amount of attorney's fees is discretionary 
with the trial court and is subject to certain conditions and 
limitations. The trial court received testimony and evidence 
regarding the amount of the attorney's fees claimed by Schurtz. 
In his brief, Schurtz challenges the adequacy of the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law claiming they are insufficient and 
lacking in detail. Schurtz's challenge of the court's Findings 
and Conclusions is insubstantial, however, for the reason that 
his counsel prepared them and any alleged inadequacy should be 
construed against Schurtz. The evidence in the record supports 
the trial court's decision on the amount of attorney's fees. 
Issue III 
Testimony and evidence was introduced in the trial court 
establishing a duplication of efforts and an overall inefficiency 
in the prosecution of the case. Schurtz's claim for attorney's 
fees included the actual amount of time spent on the case by both 
of his attorneys, including: 
1. Charges associated with the filing of an action in 
federal court which was voluntarily dismissed due to a 
failure to plead claims in an amount sufficient to meet the 
jurisdictional threshold; 
2. Fees associated with reinstating the state court action 
which was dismissed for failure to prosecute; 
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3. Fees incurred in prosecuting claims which were 
dismissed at various stages of the proceedings by the trial 
court. 
4. Fees arising out of a dispute over a failed settlement 
agreement. 
5. Fees incurred by the substitution of counsel resulting 
in the duplication of efforts. 
6. Fees incurred in attempting to negotiate an amount 
exceeding a rescission based settlement. 
The record contains ample testimony and evidence to support the 
trial court's ruling that the case could have and should have 
been settled in an amount roughly equal to the ultimate outcome. 
The record does not contain any evidence of an abuse of 
discretion in the trial court's award of attorney's fees in an 
amount less than that claimed by Schurtz. 
ARGUMENT 
Issue I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING BMW'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENYING SCHURTZ fS CLAIM FOR 
INCIDENTAL AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES. 
At trial, Schurtz testified that his major dissatisfaction 
with the Automobile was that, following its purchase, he 
discovered several problems which were not corrected to his 
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satisfaction after several visits to the BMW Dealers. Based on 
his own testimony, his Complaint was simply one for breach of 
warranty. 
A. The Record Supports The Trial Court's Ruling> 
Following the first day of trial and after hearing Schurtz's 
testimony, Judge Noel granted BMW's motion for partial summary 
judgment on the issue of incidental and consequential damages. 
Judge Noel ruled, as a matter of law, that Magnusson-Moss and the 
U.C.C. allowed the parties to enter into a contract limiting the 
remedies available under the Warranty. (Transcript at 94) . 
Schurtz did not controvert the statement of facts set out in 
BMW's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, 
(Record at 970 and 1142) as required by Rule 4-501(5) of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration and the material facts contained 
in BMW's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the 
Motion (Record at 778) were deemed to be admitted. Furthermore, 
the undisputed facts in the record were supported by Schurtz's 
testimony at trial. 
Schurtz testified that he was provided with a copy of the 
Warranty before he purchased the Automobile, that he read the 
Warranty and understood that it was a repair or replace type 
Warranty. (Transcript at 9) • The Warranty states in large 
capital letters: "BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., HEREBY EXCLUDES 
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INCIDENTAL AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING LOSS OF TIME, 
INCONVENIENCE OR LOSS OF USE OF THE VEHICLE, FOR ANY BREACH OF 
ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTY 
OF MERCHANTABILITY, APPLICABLE TO THIS PRODUCT." The exclusion 
is readily apparent on the face of the Warranty and is not 
"buried" in small type-faced boiler plate language. 
Judge Noel explained the basis for his ruling dismissing the 
claim for incidental and consequential damages as follows: 
The parties in this case contracted. The court feels 
that it would not include consequential or incidental 
damages. Counsel, you've made the argument that the 
limited warranties provide for recovery of these in 
their original purpose, that consequential and 
incidental damages are allowed to come into play under 
the U.C.C. Act. The court disagrees. The purpose of 
that provision is to provide a fair modicum of relief 
in a breach of warranty claim, when the remedy provided 
under the lemon law fails in its essential purpose. 
And under the facts and circumstances of this case, 
there would be a fair relief provided. (Transcript at 
94) . 
Judge Noel reasoned that the parties contracted to limit the 
remedies provided under the Warranty to the repair or replacement 
of the Automobile. He found that the Warranty provided a fair 
modicum of relief for the damages sustained and that it had not 
failed in its essential purpose. Furthermore, Schurtz failed to 
introduce any evidence to substantiate his claim that the 
Warranty failed in its essential purpose. To the contrary, 
Schurtz testified that prior to filing his complaint, Mr. 
Stansbury, a BMW representative, told him that BMW would refund 
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his money or replace the Automobile if it could not be repaired. 
(Transcript at 47) . 
The cases cited in Schurtzfs brief on the issue of 
incidental and consequential damages are distinguishable on the 
facts because most, if not all of the cases, contain specific 
findings of a failure in purpose. Furthermore, several of the 
cases are based on factual circumstances where dealers refused to 
make repairs. The authorities relied on by Schurtz do not apply 
under the facts before this Court on appeal. 
B. The Law Supports The Trial Court's Ruling, 
The right of contracting parties to determine and fix the 
only obligations in warranties by which they are bound has been 
held, in the absence of express statutory authority, to authorize 
contractual stipulations negativing those warranties which would 
arise by implication of law. Annot., 54 ALR 3d 1219, 1220. 
Furthermore, disclaimer of warranty clauses are authorized under 
Article 2 of the U.C.C. The Utah Legislature's adoption of the 
U.C.C incorporated the ability to exclude or modify coverage 
under warranties. 
Utah Code Ann., § 70A-2-316(4) states "remedies for breach 
of warranty can be limited in accordance with the provisions of 
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this chapter on liquidation or limitation of damages and on 
contractual modification of remedy." An agreement may provide 
for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided 
by the U.C.C. and may limit or alter the measure of damages 
recoverable by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the 
goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replcicement of 
non-conforming goods or parts. Utah Code Ann., § 70A-2-719 (3) 
specifically allows for the limitation or exclusion of 
consequential damages unless the exclusion is unconscionable. 
Even Magnusson-Moss allows a warrantor to exclude or limit 
consequential damages for breach of any written or implied 
warranty so long as the exclusion or limitation is conspicuous on 
the face of the warranty. 15 USC § 2304 (a) (3). 
Schurtz did not claim at trial that the warranty limitation was 
unconscionable. Rather, he argued that the Warranty failed of 
its essential purpose and, that he is entitled to consequential 
damages. 
In his brief on appeal Schurtz relies on the Magnusson-Moss 
Act and Utah Code Ann., § 70A-2-719(2). The purpose of § 70A-2-
719(2), as reflected in the Official Comments to the Uniform 
Commercial Code, is to make available to an aggrieved party all 
remedies provided for in our statutory scheme when the limited 
remedy provided for in the contract fails of its essential 
purpose. Even assuming, arguendo, that the warranty failed its 
essential purpose, he is not entitled to consequential damages. 
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Subsection (2) of § 70A-2-719 does provide that upon such a 
failure, a plaintiff may have the other remedies as provided in 
the U.C.C. The exclusion of consequential damages, however, is a 
separate and independent part of the warranty and is governed by 
Subsection (3), not Subsection (2) of § 70A-2-719. In his brief 
Schurtz requests this Court to interpret the provisions of the 
Magnusson-Moss Act. In interpreting the Act, however, this 
Court must be guided by the federal court's interpretations of 
the Act, In Chatlos Svs., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 
635 F. 2d 1081, 1086-87 (3rd Cir. 1980), the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals analyzed the issue of consequential damages as 
follows: 
"It appears to us that the better reasoned 
approach is to treat the consequential damage 
disclaimer as an independent provision, valid unless 
unconscionable. This poses no logical difficulties. 
A breach of contract may well contain no limitation on 
breach of warranty damages but specifically exclude 
consequential damages. Conversely, it is quite 
conceivable that some limitation might be placed on a 
breach of warranty award, but consequential damages 
would expressly be permitted. 
The limited remedy of repair and consequential 
damages exclusion are two discrete ways of attempting 
to limit recovery for breach of warranty. . . . 
The Code, moreover, tests each by a different 
standard. The former survives unless it fails of its 
essential purpose, while the latter is valid unless it 
is unconscionable. We therefore see no reason to hold, 
as a general proposition, that the failure of the 
limited remedy provided in the contract without more, 
invalidates a wholly distinct term in the agreement 
excluding consequential damages. The two are not 
mutually exclusive. 
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The testimony and evidence propounded in the trial court and 
Judge Noel's ruling establish that the Warranty did not fail in 
its essential purpose. In Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc. 265 
N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1978) and Goddard v. General Motors Corporation, 
396 N.W.2d 761 (Ohio 1979), the principal cases relied on by 
Schurtz on the issue of incidental and consequential damages, the 
warranties were found to have failed in their purpose and only 
then were the plaintiffs allowed to invoke remedies under the 
Uniform Commercial Code. Here, BMW made repairs to the 
Automobile when it was delivered to one of the defendant 
dealerships. Schurtz believed, however that BMW could not repair 
the Automobile despite its repeated offers. (Transcript at 23) . 
In Pratt v. Winnebago Industries, Inc. 463 F.Supp. 709 
(W.D.Penn., 1979), a case specifically dealing with a warranty 
for a motor vehicle under Magnusson-Moss, the court found that 
the purchasers of a mobile home were not entitled to rescission 
under Magnusson-Moss because the dealer did not have the 
opportunity to make a reasonable number of attempts to repair the 
vehicle. 
At trial, Schurtz did not dispute the limited remedy 
provided by the Warranty nor did he allege that the limitation 
was unconscionable. Furthermore, he failed to introduce any 
evidence sufficient to prove that the Warranty failed in its 
essential purpose. The authorities cited above establish that 
the exclusion of incidental and consequential damages must be 
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viewed independently from the limited warranty of repair or 
replacement and Schurtz's claim of a failure of essential purpose 
is irrelevant and immaterial as a matter of law. The trial court 
did not, therefore, err in denying Schultz's claim for incidental 
and consequential damages. 
Issue II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
ITS DECISION TO AWARD SCHURTZ LESS THAN HIS FULL CLAIM 
FOR ATTORNEYS FEES. 
In his brief on appeal, Schurtz challenges the sufficiency 
of the Findings of Fact entered by Judge Noel in support of his 
decision to award attorney fs fees in an amount less than that 
claimed by Schurtz. It must be noted that the parties 
stipulated that Schurtz was the prevailing party only for the 
limited purpose of deciding the issue of attorneyfs fees. 
(Transcript at 110; Record at 1183). As the prevailing party, 
Mr. McPhie, Schurtz's counsel prepared the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. It is within the trial court's discretion to 
adopt the Findings as submitted by the prevailing party, as long 
as the Findings are not clearly contrary to the evidence. Boyer 
Co. v. Lianell 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977). 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets a high 
standard of review for a challenge to Findings of Fact. The Rule 
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provides that Findings of Fact shall not be set aside unless 
"clearly erroneous." Under this standard of review, an 
appellate court can set aside the factual findings of a trial 
court only if they are clearly erroneous. Barker v. Francis 741 
P.2d 548 (Utah App. 1987). 
The evidence and testimony elicited at trial on the amount 
of attorney's fees established an inefficiency in the prosecution 
of the case, a duplication of efforts, and the continued 
assertion of claims previously dismissed. Judge Noel's Finding 
number four that " . . . this case could have and probably should 
have been settled very early in the proceedings for an amount 
roughly equal to the outcome" (Record at 1141) is entirely 
consistent with the evidence. Findings of Fact will be set aside 
only if they are clearly erroneous. They cannot be set aside if 
there is a reasonable basis in evidence. Gillmor v. Gillmor 745 
P.2d 461 (Utah App., 1987). 
Here the evidence consistently supports Finding number 
four. The testimony on the attorney's fee issue covers eighty 
seven pages (transcript at 113) of the two hundred page 
transcript. A full seventeen pages of Schurtz's brief (pp. 23-
40) are devoted to a paraphrased summary of the testimony. The 
trial court heard the testimony of his attorneys and had the 
ability to assess their credibility. The trial court fulfilled 
its responsibility to make a full inquiry into the amount of the 
24 
fees. Assoc. Indus. Developments v. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 486 (Utah 
1984). On appeal, this Court should not substitute its judgment 
for the trial court's assessment of the testimony. Monroe, Inc. 
v. Sidwell 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (1989). Schurtz's testimony 
(Transcript at 47) and the testimony of John Baird (Transcript at 
129 and 130) support Judge Noelfs Finding of Fact number four 
(Record at 1179) that the case ". . . could have been, and 
probably should have been, settled very early in the proceedings, 
for an amount roughly equal to the ultimate outcome." Although 
Findings should be made on all material subordinate and ultimate 
factual issues, it is not necessary for the trial court to 
resolve all conflicting evidentiary issues and the court is not 
required to negate allegations in its Findings of Fact. Sorenson 
v. Beers 614 P.2d 159 (Utah, 1980). 
In essence, Schurtz argues that the trial court should have 
believed his evidence rather than BMW's. Rule 52(a) imposes a 
substantial burden on the party challenging a trial court's 
Findings of Fact. Schurtz has the burden to cite all the 
evidence in the record that would support Judge Noel's 
determination and then demonstrate why, even when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the trial court, it is insufficient to 
support the Finding under attack. Harker v. Condominiums Forest 
Glen, Inc. 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah App., 1987). Only then can 
this Court consider whether those Finds are clearly erroneous 
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under Rule 52(a). General Glass Corp. v. Mast Const. Co. 766 
P.2d 429, 433 (Utah App. 1988). 
Schurtz has not met his burden of proof because he has 
failed to demonstrate that Judge Noel's Findings are clearly 
erroneous based on the documentary evidence and testimony at 
trial. The clear weight of the evidence supports the trial 
courtf s Findings on the attorneys fees issue and this Court 
should defer to the trial courtfs advantaged position in 
evaluating the witnesses1 demeanor and credibility. The trial 
courtfs Findings should not be disturbed in the light of 
Schurtzfs failure to meet his burden on appeal. 
Issue III 
A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL 
COURTfS DECISION TO DISCOUNT THE CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES. 
Schurtz claimed attorney's fees for Mr. Baird, his prior 
counsel, together with the fees of Mr. McPhie, his present 
counsel of record. The total amount claimed for attorney's fees 
($44,069.15 at the time of trial) substantially exceeded the 
purchase price of the Automobile, ($14,500.00) plus taxes and 
license fees. The disproportionate amount of the claim for fees 
compared to the value of the Automobile, was a major impediment 
to a settlement prior to the trial. 
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The issue of the amount of attorneys fees awarded is 
discretionary with the trial court and is subject to certain 
conditions and limitations. Travner v. Gushing, 688 P.2d 856 
(Utah 1984) . Among the factors to be considered by the trial 
court in evaluating a claim for attorneys fees are: the 
relationship of the fee to the amount recovered, the novelty and 
difficulty of the issues involved; the overall result achieved; 
and, the necessity of initiating a lawsuit to vindicate the 
rights of the contract. Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis 
Management, 645 P.2d 667, at 671 (Utah 1982). In Cabrera v, 
Cottrell 694 P. 2d 622, (Utah 1985) this court's most recent 
statement on the issue of the amount of attorneys fees, it relied 
on the elements contained in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility: 
In determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees, a 
trial judge may take into account the provision in the 
Code of Professional Responsibility which specifies the 
elements that should be considered in setting 
reasonable attorneys fees. Utah Code of Professional 
Responsibility DR 2-106. A Court may consider among 
other factors, the difficulty of the litigation, the 
efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the 
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the 
case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for 
similar services, the amount involved in the case and 
the result attained, and the expertise and experience 
of the attorneys involved. At 624-625. 
The trial court received evidence regarding the attorneys 
fees claimed by Schurtz, including the testimony of his counsel, 
John Baird and David McPhie. Other evidence was introduced 
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including time summaries and statements for fees and costs. The 
evidence, taken as a whole, established a duplication of efforts 
and an overall inefficiency in the prosecution of the case. 
Schurtzf s claim for fees included the actual amount of time spent 
on all aspects of the case including: 
(1) charges associated with the filing of an action in 
Federal Court which was voluntarily dismissed due to a 
failure to plead claims in an amount sufficient to meet the 
jurisdictional threshold; 
(2) fees associated with a state court action which was 
dismissed for failure to prosecute; 
(3) fees arising out of a dispute over settlement. 
(4) fees tied to claims which were ultimately dismissed by 
the trial court: 
a. Claim under Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
(Fifth Cause of Action). 
b. Claim for negligent and intentional 
misrepresentation. (Fourth Cause of Action). 
c. Claim for punitive damages. 
d. Claim for incidental and consequential damages. 
The limited relief granted by the trial court was based on 
the stipulation of the parties to a rescission whereby Schurtz 
agreed to return the automobile and BMW agreed to refund the 
purchase price minus a credit to BMW for actual use. All of the 
other claims alleged in the complaint were disposed of by pre-
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trial motions as outlined above. The testimony and evidence show 
that Schurtz continued to claim attorney's fees for the time 
spent in pursuing all of his alleged claims even after most of 
those claims were dismissed. 
An award of attorney's fees is generally limited to the 
prevailing issues. In Barnes v. Wood 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah, 1988) 
the Court of Appeals ruled that contractual liability for the 
payment of attorneys fees extends only to the amount necessary 
to enforce the contract. The award of attorneys fees based on a 
statute, was addressed in Graco Fishing v. Ironwood Exploration 
766 P.2d 1074 (Utah 1988). In Graco, this Court ruled that an 
award of attorney's fees under the mechanic's lien statute must 
be based on evidence which differentiates between the time spent 
on successful claims and the time spent on unsuccessful claims. 
The trial court's award of attorney's fees in an amount less than 
the total claimed by Schurtz is consistent with a reduction in 
fees to an amount consistent with the rescission based judgment. 
In support of his claim for attorneys fees, Schurtz relies 
on the case of Universal Motors, Inc. v. Waldock, 719 P.2d 254 
(Alaska 1986). A careful reading of that case reveals, however, 
that it can be distinguished on the facts. First and foremost, 
the dealer and manufacturer (also BMW), refused to authorize any 
repairs on a car under warranty. Furthermore, the defendants in 
that case refused to discuss settlement, despite several offers 
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made by the plaintiff. The Waldock case is distinguishable from 
this case for the reasons that: 
1. BMW and the defendant dealers honored the warranty 
and made repairs to the Automobile. 
2. BMW and the defendant dealers never refused to 
negotiate settlement and, in fact, made several offers 
to Schurtz. 
3. Schurtz never made an independent offer to scittle 
the case in a fixed dollar amount or on specific terms 
and conditions. 
Schurtz also cites Duval v. Midwest Auto City, Inc., 578 
F.2d 721 (1978) in support of his claim for the full amount of 
his fees notwithstanding the disproportionate relationship of the 
fees to the value of the Automobile. The Duval case is 
distinguishable, however, for the reasons that it arose out of a 
claim of odometer fraud and was brought under a federal statute 
prohibiting the disconnection of odometers. The case did not 
arise under Magnusson-Moss or the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Pre-trial settlement negotiations may be considered in 
evaluating the claim for attorney's fees since Schurtz elected to 
pay his attorneys to prosecute the case, including the punitive 
damages claim which was subsequently dismissed, rather than 
negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement. In the Waldock case, 
the court considered the defendants refusal to attempt to settle 
the case in evaluating an award of attorneys fees for the actual 
amount of time spent on the case. 
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Because the amount of attorneys fees awarded is 
discretionary, the standard of review is limited to whether the 
award of attorneys fees is supported by evidence in the record. 
Associated Indus. Developments v. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 486, 488 (Utah 
1984) . The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared 
after the date of the Minute Entry are supported by extensive 
evidence and testimony substantiating the trial court's 
determination that the case should have been settled in an amount 
roughly equal to the ultimate outcome. In Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken 94 Utah Adv. Rep.3 (1988) the Court of Appeals deferred 
to the discretion of the trial court and found that a trial 
court is allowed to reduce the amount asserted by one party in 
determining a reasonable fee. The record does not contain any 
evidence of an abuse of discretion in the trial court's award of 
attorneys fees in an amount less than that claimed by Schurtz. 
CONCLUSION 
The final Order and Judgment rendered by Judge Noel are 
proper and should be affirmed. The trial court did not err in 
granting BMW's motion for partial summary judgment on the claim 
for incidental and consequential damages. The order granting the 
motion is supported by substantial credible evidence and 
testimony in the record and the law supports the ruling. The 
trial court's Findings are adequate and sufficient to support the 
decision to award Schurtz less than the full amount of his claim 
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for attorney's fees. The clear weight of the testimony and 
evidence in the record supports the Findings and they should not 
be disturbed on appeal. Finally, a preponderance of the credible 
testimony and evidence in the record supports the trial court's 
decision to discount the claim for attorney's fees. 
For the reasons set forth herein, BMW respectfully requests 
this Court to affirm the judgment rendered by Judge Noel in the 
District Court. 
DATED this ^ day of May, 
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15 U.S.C. § 2301 
§ 2301. Definitions 
For the purposes of this chapter: 
(1) The term ''consumer product" means 
any tangible personal property which is 
distributed in commerce and which is normally 
used for personal, family, or household 
purposes (including any such property 
intended to be attached to or installed in 
any real property without regard to whether 
it is so attached or installed.) 
(2) The term "Commission" means the 
Federal Trade Commission. 
(3) The term "consumer" means a buyer 
(other than for purposes of resale) of any 
consumer product, any person to whom such 
product is transferred during the duration of 
an implied or written warranty (or service 
contract) applicable to the product, and any 
other person who is entitled by the terms of 
such warranty (or service contract) or under 
applicable State law to enforce against the 
warrantor (or service contractor) the 
obligations of the warranty (or service 
contract). 
(4) The term "supplier" means any 
person engaged in the business of making a 
consumer product directly or indirectly 
available to consumers. 
(5) The term "warrantor" means any 
supplier or other person who gives or offers 
to give a written warranty or who is or may 
be obligated under an implied warranty. 
(6) The term "written warranty" means-
vi 
sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a 
buyer which relates to the nature of the 
material or workmanship and affirms or 
promises that such material or workmanship is 
defect free or will meet a specified level of 
performance over a specified period of time, 
or 
(B) any undertaking in writing in 
connection with the sale by a supplier of a 
consumer* product to refund, repair, replace, 
or take other remedial action with respect to 
such product in the event that such product 
fails to meet the specifications set forth in 
the undertaking, 
which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking 
becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a 
supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale 
of such product. 
(7) The term "implied warranty" means an 
implied warranty arising under State law (as 
modified by sections 2308 and 2304(a) of this 
title) in connection with the sale of a supplier of 
a consumer product. 
(8) The term "service contract" means a 
contract in writing to perform, over a fixed period 
of time or for a specified duration, services 
relating to the maintenance or repair (or both) of 
a consumer product. 
(9) The term "reasonable and necessary 
maintenance" consists of those operations (A) which 
the consumer reasonably can be expected to perform 
or have performed and (B) which are necessary to 
keep any consumer product performing its intended 
function and operating at a reasonable level of 
performance. 
(10) The term "remedy" means whichever of the 
following actions the warrantor elects: 
(A) repair, 
(B) replacement, or 
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(C) refund; 
except that the warrantor may not elect refund 
unless (i) the warrantor is unable to provide 
replacement and repair is not commercially 
practicable or cannot be timely made, or (ii) the 
consumer is willing to accept such refund. 
(11) The term "replacement" means furnishing 
a new consumer product which is identical or 
reasonably equivalent to the warranted 
(12) The term "refund" means refunding the 
actual purchase price (less reasonable depreciation 
based on actual use where permitted by rules of the 
Commission). 
(13) The term "distributed in commerce" means 
sold in commerce, introduced or delivered for 
introduction into commerce, or held for sale or 
distribution after introduction into commerce. 
(14) The term "commerce" means trade, 
traffic, commerce, or transportation -
(A) between a place in a State and any 
place outside thereof, or 
(B) which affects trade, traffic, 
commerce, or transportation described in 
subparagraph (A). 
(15) The term "State" means a State, the 
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the Canal Zone, or 
American Samoa. The term "State of law" includes a 
law of the United States applicable only to the 
District of Columbia or only to a territory or 
possession of the United States; and the term 
"Federal law" excludes any State law. 
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15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3) 
§ 2304(a). In order for a warrantor warranting a 
consumer product by means of a written warranty to 
meet the Federal minimum standards for warranty -
(3) such warrantor may not exclude or 
limit consequential damages for breach of any 
written or implied warranty on such product, 
unless such exclusion or limitation 
conspicuously appears on the face of the 
warranty . . • ; 
ix 
Rule 4-501 CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
X 
Rule 4-501 CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
(5) The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judg-
ment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material 
facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists Each disputed fact 
shall be stated m separate numbered sentences and shall refer with particu-
larity to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, 
and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the mov-
ant's facts that are disputed All material facts set forth m the movant's 
statement shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment 
unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 52 
xi 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 52 
Rule 52. Findings by the court, 
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Uniform Commercial Code § 70A-2-316 
xii 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
70A-2-316. Exclusion or modification of warranties — 
Livestock-
CD Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and 
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wher-
ever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of 
this chapter on parol or extrinsic evidence (section 70A-2-202) negation or 
limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable. 
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of 
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability 
and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any 
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicu-
ous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it 
states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the 
description on the face hereof." 
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2) 
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties 
are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults" or other lan-
guage which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the 
exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied war-
ranty; and 
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the 
goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to 
examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects 
which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to 
him: and 
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of 
dealing or course of performance or usage of trade. 
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter on liquidation or limitation of damages and on 
contractual modification of remedy (sections 70A-2-718 and 70A-2-719). 
(5) If a contract for the sale of livestock, which may include cattle, hogs, 
sheep, and horses, does not contain a written statement as to warranty of 
merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose, there shall be no implied 
warranty that the livestock are free from disease and sickness at the time of 
the sale and the seller shall not be liable for damages arising from the lack of 
merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. 
SALES § 2—316 
ity" clauses. This Article treats 
the limitation or avoidance of 
consequential damages as a mat-
ter of limiting remedies for 
breach, separate from the matter 
of creation of liability under a 
warranty. If no warranty ex-
ists, there is of course no prob-
lem of limiting remedies for 
breach of warranty. Under sub-
section (4) the question of limi-
tation of remedy is governed by 
the sections referred to rather 
than by this section. 
3. Disclaimer .of the implied 
warranty • of - merchantability. is
 :t 
permitted under subsection '(2);> 
but with the safeguard that such » 
disclaimers „ must mention mer-/ 
chantability and in : case of a> 
writing must be conspicuous.* 
4. Unlike the implied warran-
ty of merchantability, implied 
warranties of fitness for a par-,, 
ticular purpose may be excluded
 f 
by general language, but only if 
it Js,in writing and conspicuous. 
5. Subsection (2) presup-
poses that the implied warranty 
in question exists unless exclud-
ed or modified. Whether or not 
language of disclaimer satisfies 
the requirements of this section, 
such language may be relevant 
under other sections to the ques-
tion whether the warranty was 
ever in fact created. Thus, un-
less the provisions of this Ar-
ticle on parol and extrinsic evi-
dence prevent, oral language of 
disclaimer may raise issues of 
fact as to whether reliance by 
the buyer occurred and whether 
the seller had "reason to know'* 
under the section on implied 
warranty of fitness for a particu-
lar purpose. 
6. The exceptions to the gen-
eral rule set forth in paragraphs 
(a), (b) and (c) of subsection 
(3) are common factual situa-
tions in which the circumstances 
surrounding the transaction are 
in themselves sufficient to call 
the buyer's attention to the fact 
that no implied warranties are 
made or that a certain implied 
warranty is being excluded. 
7. Paragraph (a) of subsec-
tion (3) deals with general terms 
such as "as is," "as they stand," 
"with all faults," and the like. 
Such terms in ordinary commer-
cial usage are understood to 
mean that the buyer takes the 
entire risk as to the quality of 
the goods involved. The terms 
covered by paragraph (a) are 
in fact merely a particulariza-
tion of paragraph (c) which pro-
vides for exclusion or modifica-
tion of implied warranties by 
usage of trade. 
8. Under paragraph (b) of 
subsection (3) warranties may 
be excluded or modified by the 
circumstances where the buyer 
examines the goods or a sample 
or model of them before entering 
into the contract. "Examina-
t ion"-^ used in this paragraph/ 
is not synonymous with inspec- , 
tion before acceptance or at any 
other time after the contract has , 
been made. It goes rather to the 
nature of the responsibility as-
sumed by the seller at the time 
of the making of the contract. 
Of course if the buyer discovers 
the defect and uses the goods 
anyway, or if he unreasonably 
fails to examine the goods before 
he uses them, resulting injuries 
may be found to result from his 
own action rather than proxi-
mately from a breach of warran-
ty. See Sections 2—314 and 2— 
715 and comments thereto. 
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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
70A-2-719. Contractual modification or limitation of remedy. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section 
and of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of dam-
ages, 
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in 
substitution for those provided in this chapter and may limit 
or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this 
chapter, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the 
goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replace-
ment of nonconforming goods or parts; and 
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy 
is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the 
sole remedy. 
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail 
of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this act. 
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the 
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable., Limitation of consequen-
tial damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods 
is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the 
loss is commercial is not 
§ 2—719 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
Official 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi-
sion: None. 
Purposes: 
1. Under this section parties 
are left free to shape their rem-
edies to their particular require-
ments and reasonable agree-
ments limiting or modifying 
remedies are to be given effect. 
However, it is of the very es-
sence of a sales contract that at 
least minimum adequate reme-
dies be available. If the parties 
intend to conclude a contract 
for sale within this Article they 
must accept the legal conse-
quence that there be at least a 
fair .quantum of remedy for 
breach of the obligations or du-
ties r outlined - in the contract. 
Thus any clause purporting to 
modify or limit the remedial pro-
visions of this Article in an un-
conscionable manner is subject 
to deletion and in that event the 
remedies made available by this 
Article are applicable as if the 
stricken clause had never exist-
ed. Similarly, under subsection 
(2), where an apparently fair 
and reasonable clause because 
of circumstances fails in its pur-» 
pose or operates to deprive ei-' 
ther * party of the substantial 
value of the bargain, it must* 
give way to the general remedy 
provisions of this Article., 
2. Subsection (1) (b) creates 
a presumption that clauses pre-
scribing remedies are cumula-
tive rather than exclusive. If 
the parties intend the term to 
describe the sole remedy under 
the contract, this must be clearly 
expressed. 
3. Subsection (3) recognizes 
the validity of clauses limiting 
or excluding consequential dam-
ages but makes it clear that they 
may not operate in an uncon-
scionable manner. Actually 
such terms are merely an alloca-
tion of unknown or undeter-
minable risks. The seller in all 
cases is free to disclaim war-
ranties in the manner provided 
in Section 2—316. 
Cross References: 
Point 1: Section 2—302. 
Point 3: Section 2—316. 
Definitional Cross References: 
"Agreement". Section 1—201. 
"Buyer". Section 2—103. 
"Conforming". Section 2— 
106. 
"Contract". Section 1—201. 
"Goods". Section 2—105. 
"Remedy". Section 1—201. 
"Seller". Section 2—103. 
